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The Big Match with a clock and a bit of memory
SUBMISSION ##
e Big Match is a multi-stage two-player game. In each stage Player 1 hides one or two pebbles in his hand,
and his opponent has to guess that number; Player 1 loses a point if Player 2 is correct, and otherwise he wins
a point. As soon as Player 1 hides one pebble, the players cannot change their choices in any future stage.
Blackwell and Ferguson (1968) give an ε-optimal strategy for Player 1 that hides, in each stage, one pebble
with a probability that depends on the entire past history. Any strategy that depends just on the clock or on a
nite memory is worthless. e long-standing natural open problem has been whether every strategy that
depends just on the clock and a nite memory is worthless.
e present paper proves that there is such a strategy that is ε-optimal. In fact, we show that just two states
of memory are sucient.
1 INTRODUCTION
e game of Odd and Even (Latin: Par Impar Ludere, Greek: ἀρτιασµός) has been popular since
ancient Greek and Roman times. It is played by two players, Player 1 and Player 2. Player 1 hides
(e.g., in his hands) a number of pebbles or other items (e.g., beans, nuts, almonds, astragali, or
coins), and his opponent, Player 2, has to guess whether the number of hidden items is odd or even.
Player 1 then reveals the number. If Player 2 is right, Player 1 loses a point; otherwise, Player 1
wins a point (from Player 2).
Player 1 can guarantee that he gets (at least) zero points on average by hiding an odd or even
number of items with equal probability. Player 2 can guarantee that Player 1 gets (at most) zero
points on average by guessing odd or even with equal probability.
e repeated Odd and Even game is the same game repeated many times. e players can
still guarantee geing zero points on average (per stage and hence also in total) by playing,
independently in each stage as before.
e Big Match is also a multi-stage game. It is a variant of the repeated Odd and Even game. In
each stage Player 1 hides one or two pebbles. In each stage, Player 1 wins or loses a point. As long
as Player 1 hides two pebbles, Player 1 wins a point i Player 2 guesses odd in that stage. e rst
stage in which Player 1 hides one pebble is called the stopping stage. In the stopping stage Player 1
wins a point i Player 2 guesses even. In each subsequent stage, he wins a point i he won a point
in the stopping stage.
e Big Match was introduced by Gillee [Gillee, 1957] and has been much studied, in part
due to its arguably being the most basic game model that illustrates the diculty of balancing the
trade-o between short- and long-term strategic considerations.
In the Big Match, Player 2 can still guarantee that Player 1 gets zero points on average, indepen-
dently of the number of stages, by guessing odd or even with equal probability and independently
in each stage. Executing such a strategy does not require that Player 2 know past history, the
number of stages, or the stage number. However, the situation of Player 1 is completely dierent!
Henceforth, unless otherwise mentioned, a strategy refers to a strategy of Player 1.
If Player 1 knows the number of stages, n, in advance, he can guarantee that he gets (at least) zero
points on average. To guarantee this, he must hide one pebble with probability 1k+1 when k stages
remain. us, for example, in the last stage he hides one or two pebbles with equal probability, and
in the rst stage he hides one pebble with probability 1n+1 . Executing such a strategy requires that
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Player 1 know the stage number and the number of stages, but it does not require that Player 1
know past history.
It follows from the above that if Player 1 does not know the number of stages n in advance, then
he has no way of guaranteeing (at least) zero points (per stage) on average. is has led researchers
to look for strategies that guarantee close to zero per stage on average in all suciently long Big
Match games.
Any strategy in the Big Match has to decide on the stopping stage. A natural possibility is just to
specify in advance the probability of each stage being the stopping stage. Such a strategy is called
a Markov strategy. It has long been known, and it is easy to verify, that any Markov strategy in the
Big Match is worthless; i.e., for any ε > 0 it does not guarantee more than −1 + ε points (per stage)
on average in any suciently long Big Match game.
e principle of sunk cost seems to imply that optimizing from any point onwards should be
independent of the past, and hence any optimization of the long-run average of the rewards can
be achieved by a Markov strategy. Since any Markov strategy is worthless, one may erroneously
conclude that any strategy is worthless.
However, this is not the case! Blackwell and Ferguson [Blackwell and Ferguson, 1968] introduced
worthy (i.e., not worthless) strategies that prescribe the choice in each stage as a function of past
history. Moreover, [Blackwell and Ferguson, 1968] introduced, for every ε > 0, a strategy that is
ε-optimal; namely, it guarantees at least −ε points (per stage) on average in all suciently long
games.1
e question that arises is how much dependence on past history is needed for an ε-optimal
strategy, or even a worthy one. is dependence is formalized using the following concept.
A memory-based strategy in the Big Match is a strategy in which the conditional probability
of hiding one pebble depends on the current memory state and the clock (i.e, the stage number).
e memory state is updated as a stochastic function of the current memory and of the guess of
Player 2 in the previous stage, as well as of the clock.
e ε-optimal strategies in [Blackwell and Ferguson, 1968, eorem 2] are memory-based, and
those in [Blackwell and Ferguson, 1968, eorem 1] are memory-based and clock-independent;
i.e., the hiding and memory updating do not depend on the clock. e memory state is simply the
dierence between the number of odd and even guesses; hence, up to stage n it takes integer values
in the interval [−n,n].
e ε-optimal strategy in [Hansen et al., 2016] is memory-based and clock-independent. e
memory state can be encoded so that, with high probability, up to stage n it takes integer values in
[0, lnc n], for some constant c (and n > 3).
On the other hand, all memory-based strategies that have a nite set of memory states and either
are clock-independent (see, e.g., [Sorin, 2002]) or have a deterministic memory update function
[Hansen et al., 2016] are worthless in the Big Match.
It has been a long-standing natural open problem whether there exists a worthy memory-based
strategy that has a nite set of memory states.
e present paper answers this question positively. We show that, for every ε > 0, there is such
a strategy that is ε-optimal. Moreover, it is a two-memory strategy; namely, it has a two-element
memory set.
Our positive result applies to the innite game as well. In the innite game, the average win
per stage need not be well dened, as the average number of wins over the rst n stages need not
converge. Nonetheless, our result is as strong as possible given that the strategy’s ε-optimality in
the innite game is for the limit inferior.
1Recall that Player 2 has a strategy that ensures 0 per stage on average.
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2 THE MODEL AND RELATED RESULTS
2.1 Stochastic games
A nite two-person zero-sum stochastic game Γ, henceforth, a stochastic game, is dened by a tuple
(Z , I , J , r ,p), where Z is a nite state space, I and J are the nite actions sets of Players 1 and 2
respectively, r : Z × I × J → R is a payo function, and p : Z × I × J → ∆(Z ) is a transition function.
A state z ∈ Z is called an absorbing state if p(z, ·, ·) = δz , where δz is the Dirac measure on z. An
absorbing game is a stochastic games with only one nonabsorbing state.
A play of the stochastic game is an innite sequence z1, . . . , zt , it , jt , . . ., where (zt , it , jt ) ∈
Z × I × J . e set of all plays is denoted by H∞. A play up to stage t is the nite sequence
ht = (z1, i1, j1, . . . , zt ). e payo rt in stage t is r (zt , it , jt ) and the average of the payos in the
rst n stages, 1n
∑n
t=1 rt , is denoted by r¯n .
e initial state of the multi-stage game is z1 ∈ Z . In the t-th stage players simultaneously
choose actions it ∈ I and jt ∈ J .
A behavioral strategy of Player 1, respectively Player 2, is a function σ , respectively τ , from the
disjoint union Û∪∞t=1(Z × I × J )t−1 ×Z to ∆(I ), respectively to ∆(J ). e restriction of σ , respectively
τ , to (Z × I × J )t−1 × Z is denoted by σt , respectively τt . In what follows, σ denotes a strategy of
Player 1 and τ denotes a strategy of Player 2.
A strategy pair (σ ,τ ) denes a probability distribution Pσ ,τ on the space of plays as follows. e
conditional probability of (it = i, jt = j) given the play ht up to stage t is the product of σ (ht )[i]
and τ (ht )[j]. e conditional distribution of zt+1 given ht , it , jt is p(zt , it , jt ). e expectation w.r.t.
Pσ ,τ is denoted by Eσ ,τ
A stochastic game has a value v = (v(z))z∈Z if, for every ε > 0, there are strategies σε and τε
such that for some positive integer nε
ε + Eσε ,τ r¯n ≥ v(z1) ≥ Eσ ,τε r¯n − ε ∀σ ,τ ,n ≥ nε , (1)
and
ε + Eσε ,τ lim infn→∞ r¯n ≥ v(z1) ≥ Eσ ,τε lim supn→∞ r¯n − ε ∀σ ,τ . (2)
It is known that all absorbing games [Kohlberg, 1974] and, more generally, all stochastic games
[Mertens and Neyman, 1981] have a value.
A strategy σε that satises the le-hand inequality (1) is called uniform ε-optimal. A strategy σε
that satises the le-hand inequality (2) is called limiting-average ε-optimal.
A strategy σε that satises both le-hand inequalities (1) and (2) is called ε-optimal.
2.2 Memory-based strategies
A memory-based strategy σ generates a random sequence of memory statesm1, . . . ,mt ,mt+1, . . .,
where the memory is updated stochastically in each stage, and selects its action it according to a
distribution that depends on just the current time t , its current memorymt , and the current state
zt . Explicitly, the conditional distribution of it , given hmt := (z1,m1, i1, j1, . . . , zt ,mt ), is a function
σα of (t , zt ,mt ) and the conditional distribution ofmt+1, given (hmt , it , jt , zt+1), is a function σm of
(t , zt ,mt , it , jt ) (i.e., it depends on just the time t and the tuple (zt ,mt , it , jt )).
A memory-based strategy σ is clock-independent if the functions σα and σm are independent of t .
A k-memory strategy is a memory-based strategy in which the memory statesmt take values
in a set with (at most) k elements. Note that a strategy is a Markov strategy if and only if it is
a one-memory strategy, and a strategy is a stationary strategy if and only if it is a one-memory
clock-independent strategy. A strategy uses nite memory if it is a k-memory strategy where k is
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nite. A strategy that uses nite memory is called a nite-memory strategy. e set of all k-memory
strategies is denoted byMk .
e long-standing natural open problem that motivates the present paper is whether for every
stochastic game, or even just the Big Match, there are ε-optimal strategies that use nite memory.
Another natural problem is the existence of memory-based strategies with innite memory but
where the number of distinct memory states used in the rst n stages grows slowly with high
probability. For this question we assume, w.l.o.g., that the memories take values in the set N of
natural numbers. Let f : N→ R+ be a nondecreasing function and γ ≥ 0.
An (f ,γ )-memory strategy is a memory-based strategy in which, with probability at least 1 − γ ,
N 3mt ≤ f (t) for all t and every strategy of the other player.
2.3 The Big Match
e Big Match, introduced in [Gillee, 1957], is a highly inspiring stochastic game. e state space
Z is {−1, 0, 1}.
Each state x ∈ {−1, 1} is absorbing and the payo function (to Player 1) in an absorbing state x
is r (x , ·, ·) = x .
e action sets I and J are {0, 1}, and the payo function in the nonabsorbing state 0 is
r (0, i, j) =
{
1 if j , i,
−1 if j = i .
e transition distributions from the nonabsorbing state 0 are given by
p(0, i, j) =

δ 0 if i = 0
δ-1 if i = j = 1
δ 1 if i = 1 , j .
[Blackwell and Ferguson, 1968] shows that the value of the Big Match is 0 by introducing, for
every ε > 0, an ε-optimal strategy (which is, in addition, a clock-independent (f , 0)-memory
strategy where f (n) = 2n − 1).
[Hansen et al., 2016] introduces, for the Big Match (and also for any absorbing game), a clock-
independent (f ,γ )-memory strategy, where f (n) = (logn)O (1) and any γ > 0, that is ε-optimal.
Fix ε < 1. It is known that there is neither a limiting-average nor a uniform ε-optimal strategy
that is a nite-memory strategy that uses a deterministic memory updating function σm ; see
[Hansen et al., 2016] for the limiting-average case. Moreover, there is no ε-optimal mixed strategy
that is a mixture of nitely many nite-memory strategies that each use a deterministic memory
updating function σm .
It is also known that there is neither a limiting-average nor a uniform ε-optimal strategy that
is a clock-independent nite-memory strategy; see, e.g., [Sorin, 2002] for the limiting-average
case. Moreover, there is no mixed strategy that is a mixture of clock-independent nite-memory
strategies that is ε-optimal [Amitai, 1989].
3 THE RESULT
e main result of the present paper is that, in the Big Match, there is a nite-memory strategy
that is ε-optimal and moreover that is a two-memory strategy.
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Theorem 3.1. For every ε > 0 there is a 2-memory strategy σ of Player 1 and nε such that for every
strategy τ of Player 2,
Eσ ,τ lim inf
n→∞ r¯n ≥ −ε, (3)
and
Eσ ,τ r¯n ≥ −ε ∀n ≥ nε . (4)
4 THE PROOF
e set of stages t = 1, 2, . . . of the innite game is partitioned into consecutive epochs, indexed by
i = 1, 2, . . ., where the number of stages of the i-th epoch is si .
e number of stages in the rst n epochs equals
∑n
i=1 si and is denoted by Sn . e payo to
Player 1 in the j-th round of epoch i is denoted by r ij . Note that the j-th round of epoch i is the
(Si−1 + j)-th stage of the game. erefore, ∑Snt=1 rt = ∑ni=1∑sij=1 r ij .
If sn/Sn goes to 0 as n goes to innity, then in order to prove the theorem we have to dene a
strategy σ ∈ M2 of Player 1 and nε such that for every pure strategy x of Player 2 and n ≥ nε , we
have
Eσ ,x lim inf
n→∞
1
Sn
n∑
i=1
si∑
j=1
r ij ≥ −5ε (5)
and
Eσ ,x
1
Sn
n∑
i=1
si∑
j=1
r ij ≥ −5ε . (6)
e strategy σ consists of patching together strategies σsi ,ρ , which will be dened later, where
σsi ,ρ is a strategy in the i-th epoch. e strategy σsi ,ρ in the i-th epoch depends on the number
of stages si in the epoch and a xed positive number ρ. If s = 1 then σs,ρ plays the nonabsorbing
action. We proceed with the denition of the strategy σs,ρ for s > 1.
Let δ > 0 be a suciently small number and let s > 1 be an integer.
We dene a strategy σs,δ of Player 1 in the auxiliary game in three equivalent descriptions. e
rst description illustrates that σs,δ is inM2, namely, that it is a two-memory strategy.
e two states of memory of the strategy σs,δ are Ĉ (for continuing throughout) and Â (for
possible future absorption).
e initial state of memory, m1, is Â. On mt = A and xt = 1 (i.e., in the case that mt = A and
xt = 1), the conditional probability thatmt+1 = C is 1 − e−2δ , and in all other cases,mt+1 =mt .
e strategy plays the action C if it is in memory state Ĉ . When it is in memory state Â it
plays the absorbing action A with a conditional probability that depends on the round, and this
conditional probability is given by qi/(1 −∑k<j qk ), where
qj := (eδ − 1)e−δ seδ (j−1).
e second description, which is easily seen to be equivalent to the rst one, is as follows. Select
a positive integer `, where for each 1 ≤ j ≤ s , the probability that the selected ` equals j is qj .
Sample the action of Player 2 in each round k with probability 1 − e−2δ and let the sampling of the
dierent rounds be independent. Play the absorbing action in round j i j = ` ≤ s and the payo
in each of the previously sampled rounds is −1.
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e third description is useful in the proof, and in addition it is short. e strategy σs,δ of Player 1
plays the absorbing action in stage 1 ≤ j ≤ s with (unconditional) probability
pj := (eδ − 1)e−δ se−δ
∑
k< j xk ,
where xk is the payo of Player 1 at stage k .
Obviously, one has to show that the third description indeed denes a strategy. is will follow
from the sequel where we show that this description is equivalent to the previous ones, which
clearly dene a strategy. For completeness, we show that the third description denes a strategy
without relying on the equivalence of the descriptions.
Note that pj is a function of the stream of past actions and thus well dened. In addition, pj ≥ 0
and
s∑
j=1
pj =
s∑
j=1
(eδ − 1)e−δ se−δ
∑
k< j xk ≤
s∑
j=1
(eδ − 1)e−δ seδ (j−1)
= 1 − e−δ s ,
and therefore the third description denes a strategy.
Now we show that the third description is equivalent to the previous ones. e (unconditional)
probability (of the second described strategy) of playing the absorbing action at stage j equals qj
times the probability of no sampling in an earlier round where Player 2 played the action 1. As the
number of rounds before j where Player 2 played the action 1 equals
∑
k<j
xk+1
2 and the conditional
probability of not sampling a round is e−2δ , the above-mentioned product equals
qje
−2δ ∑k< j xk +12 = (eδ − 1)e−δ seδ (j−1)e−δ (j−1)−δ ∑k< j xk = pj .
Consider the auxiliary games with s+1 stages, where dynamics and stage payos follow the
rules of the Big Match and the players are active only in the rst s stages j, j = 1, . . . , s .
Let σ = σs,δ . We study the distribution of the state in the last period, s + 1, as a function of the
strategy σ of Player 1 and a pure strategy τ of Player 2.
Let τ be a pure strategy of Player 2. Labeling the le-column action of Player 2 by -1 and the
right-column action of Player 2 by 1, the pure strategy τ of Player 2 is identied with the sequence
of actions x = x(τ ) = (x1, . . . ,xs ).
Dene a function v on plays of the auxiliary (s+1)-stage game as follows. If the play is absorbed
in the winning state for Player 1, then v = 1. If the play is absorbed in the losing state for Player 1,
then v = −e−δ , and otherwise v = 0.
Lemma 4.1. Let α(x) = −∑sj=1 x j/s . en
Eσ ,xv = e
(α (x )−1)sδ − e−sδ (7)
≥ e(ε−1)sδ 1{α (x )≥ε } − e−sδ ∀ε > 0. (8)
Proof. For every integer c let J+c be the set of all indices 1 ≤ j ≤ s such that c = −
∑
k<j xk
and x j = −1, and let J−c be the set of all indices 1 ≤ j ≤ s such that c + 1 = −
∑
k<j xk and x j = 1.
Obviously, for each integer c , the sets of indices J+c and J−c are disjoint, and the set of integers is the
disjoint union ∪c (J+c ∪ J−c ).
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Obviously, if j ∈ J+c and j ′ ∈ J−c then e−δ (c+1) = e−δe−δ
∑
k< j xk = e−δ
∑
k< j′ xk . erefore, using
the third description of the strategy, we have
Eσ ,xv =
s∑
j=1
1{x j=−1}pj −
s∑
j=1
1{x j=1}pje−δ
=
∑
c
∑
j ∈J +c
(eδ − 1)e−δ secδ −
∑
c
∑
j ∈J −c
(eδ − 1)e−δ secδ .
Note that
|J+c | =

|J−c | if α > 0 and c < {0, 1, . . . ,αs−1}
|J−c | + 1 if α > 0 and c ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,αs−1}
|J−c | if α = 0
|J−c | if α < 0 and −c < {1, 2, . . . ,−αs}
|J−c | − 1 if α < 0 and −c ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,−αs}.
erefore,
Eσ ,xv =

∑αs−1
j=0 (eδ − 1)e−δ se jδ = e(α−1)sδ − e−sδ if α > 0,∑−αs
j=1 (eδ − 1)e−δ se−jδ = e(α−1)sδ − e−sδ if α ≤ 0.
(9)
is completes the proof of equality (7).
e function α 7→ e(α−1)sδ is nonnegative and monotonic increasing in α , and e(α−1)sδ ≥
e(ε−1)sδ 1{α ≥ε } . erefore, equality (7) implies inequality (8), which completes the proof of the
lemma. 
Let ε > 0 be suciently small and let iε be a suciently large positive integer so that
∞∑
i=iε+1
e
i(1+ε )
< min(ε, 1 − e−δ ). (10)
Let δ > 0 be suciently small so that 1−e−δ < ε . Let si be the largest integer such that esiδ ≤ i1+ε
if i > iε , and si = 1 if i ≤ iε . Note that for i > iε we have esiδ ≤ i1+ε ≤ esiδeδ .
Let vi be the above-dened function v at the end of the i-th epoch; equivalently, at the start of
the (i + 1)-th epoch.
We proceed with the denition of the strategy σ of Player 1. e strategy σ plays in the i-th
epoch the strategy σsi ,δ .
Let τ be a pure strategy of Player 2 and let x i = (x i1, . . . ,x isi ) be the sequence of actions of Player 2
in epoch i assuming no absorption, and set
αi =
{
−∑sij=1 x ij /si if vi−1 = 0 and i > iε ,
0 otherwise.
(11)
Inequality (8) along with the denition of αi implies that for i ≥ iε ,
Eσ ,x (vi −vi−1 | Hi ) ≥ e(ε−1)siδ 1{αi ≥ε } − e−siδ
≥ iε2−11{αi ≥ε } −
e
i1+ε
, (12)
whereHi is the history of play up to the start of the i-th epoch, and the denition of σ implies that
for 1 ≤ i < iε , we have vi = vi−1.
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Dene
Yi = vi −
∞∑
k>max(i,iε )
e
k (1+ε )
.
en, by the denition of vi and (10), |Yi | < 1, and, as Yi − Yi−1 = vi − vi−1 for i < iε and
Yi − Yi−1 = vi −vi−1 + ei1+ε for i ≥ iε , inequality (12) implies that
Eσ ,x (Yi − Yi−1 | Hi ) ≥ iε2−11{αi ≥ε } . (13)
erefore, (Yi )i>iε is a bounded submartingale and therefore converges a.e. (namely, with
probability 1) to a limit Y∞. As vi − Yi →i→∞ 0, vi converges to Y∞ as i goes to innity.
Note that
si∑
j=1
(r ij −vi−1) ≥

−εsi ≥ −εsi − si1{αi ≥ε } if vi−1 = −e−δ
0 ≥ −εsi − si1{αi ≥ε } if vi−1 = 1
−αisi ≥ −εsi − si1{αi ≥ε } if vi = vi−1 = 0
−si = −si1{vi,vi−1 } if vi , vi−1 = 0.
(14)
erefore,
si∑
j=1
(r ij −vi−1) ≥ −εsi − si1{αi ≥ε } − si1{vi−1,vi } . (15)
Summing these inequalities over 1 ≤ i ≤ n we deduce that
n∑
i=1
si∑
j=1
r ij ≥
n∑
i=1
si (vi−1 − ε) −
n∑
i=1
si1{αi ≥ε } −
n∑
i=1
si1{vi−1,vi } . (16)
Note that −1 < Yi < 1. erefore Yi − Yj < 2. Taking the expectations in inequality (13), we
deduce that Eσ ,x (Yi − Yi−1) ≥ Eσ ,x iε1−11{αi ≥ε } . Summing these inequalities over all i such that
1 ≤ i ≤ n, we deduce that
2 > Eσ ,x (Yn − Y0) ≥ Eσ ,x
n∑
i=1
iε
2−11{αi ≥ε } . (17)
us, 2 ≥ Eσ ,x ∑∞i=1 iε2−11{αi ≥ε } . Hence, ∑∞i=1 iε2−11{αi ≥ε } is nite a.e.
Note that Sn ≥ n2 lnn for all suciently large n and, as eδ si ≤ i1+ε , si ≤ 1+εδ ln i ≤ 1+εδ lnn for
i ≤ n. erefore, as ∑ni=1 1{vi,vi−1 } ≤ 1,
1
Sn
n∑
i=1
si1{vi,vi−1 } ≤
sn
Sn
→n→∞ 0, (18)
and for all suciently large n and i ≤ n, we have siSn ≤
2(1+ε )
δ n
−ε2nε2−1 ≤ 2(1+ε )δ n−ε
2
iε
2−1. Hence,
1
Sn
n∑
i=1
si1{αi ≥ε } ≤
1 + ε
δ
n−ε
2
n∑
i=1
iε
2−11{αi ≥ε } →n→∞ 0 a.e. (19)
As vi − ε →i→∞ Y∞ − ε , siSn →n→∞ 0 (for each xed i), and Sn =
∑n
i=1 si , we have
1
Sn
n∑
i=1
si (vi−1 − ε) →n→∞ Y∞ − ε a.e. (20)
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erefore, using (16), (18), (19), and (20), we deduce that
lim inf
n→∞
1
Sn
n∑
i=1
si∑
j=1
r ij ≥ Y∞ − ε a.e. (21)
As Eσ ,xY∞ ≥ Y0 ≥ v0 − ε we conclude that (5) holds, i.e.,
Eσ ,x lim inf
n→∞
1
Sn
n∑
i=1
si∑
j=1
r ij ≥ v0 − 2ε . (22)
We proceed to prove (6). Let nε be a suciently large integer so that 2(1+ε )δ n
−ε2
ε <
ε
2 . Hence,
si
Sn
≤ iε2−1ε/2 for every n ≥ nε and i ≤ n. en, using inequality (17), we have
Eσ ,x
1
Sn
n∑
i=1
si1{αi ≥ε } ≤ Eσ ,x
n∑
i=1
iε
2−11{αi ≥ε }ε/2 ≤ ε ∀n ≥ nε . (23)
As vi ≥ Yi and Eσ ,xYi ≥ Y0 ≥ v0 − ε ,
Eσ ,x
1
Sn
n∑
i=1
sivi−1 ≥ v0 − ε . (24)
Asvi = vi−1 whenevervi−1 equals either 1 or−e−δ ,∑ni=1 1{vi,vi−1 } ≤ 1. Hence, 1Sn ∑ni=1 si1{vi,vi−1 } ≤
sn/Sn ≤ ε for every n ≥ nε and, in particular,
Eσ ,x
1
Sn
n∑
i=1
si1{vi,vi−1 } ≤ ε ∀n ≥ nε . (25)
Taking expectation in inequality (16), and using inequalities (25), (24), and (23), we deduce that
for n ≥ nε we have
Eσ ,x
1
Sn
n∑
i=1
si∑
j=1
r ij ≥ v0 − ε − ε − ε − ε ≥ v0 − 4ε,
which completes the proof of (6).
5 OPEN PROBLEMS
e main open problem is whether or not in any stochastic game each player has a nite-memory
strategy that is ε-optimal.
In the remainder of this section we introduce several additional open problems. ese open
problems are of independent interest and a few of them may turn out to be building blocks toward
the solution of the main open problem.
5.1 Private versus public memory states
e ε-optimal two-memory strategy in our proof uses private memory states (i.e., states that are
not observable by Player 2).
We say that the memory states mt are public if they are observed by all players. For example,
the memory states of the Blackwell and Ferguson [Blackwell and Ferguson, 1968] strategy in the
Big Match, which are the possible dierences between the number of odd and even guesses of
Player 2, are public. So are the memory states of the Mertens and Neyman [Mertens and Neyman,
1981] ε-optimal strategies in a stochastic game, and so are the memory states of any memory-based
strategy in which the memory update functions are deterministic. e memory states of the
ε-optimal strategies that are introduced in [Hansen et al., 2016] are private.
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All the above-mentioned ε-optimal strategies are memory-based strategies with an innite set of
memory states. A generalization of the proof of [Hansen et al., 2016, eorem 6] shows that in the
Big Match any nite-memory strategy whose memory states are public is worthless.
A natural question that arises is what is the minimal size of a public memory (as a function of t )
that is needed for an ε-optimal strategy in a stochastic game. In order to state this problem formally,
we introduce the concept of a public (f ,γ )-memory strategy, where f : N→ N is a nondecreasing
function and γ > 0.
A public (f ,γ )-memory strategy is a memory-based strategy σ whose memory states are public
and such that for every strategy τ of Player 2, with probability Pσ ,τ at least 1 − γ , N 3 mt ≤ f (t)
for all t .
Note that we distinguish between a public nite-memory strategy and a mixed strategy that is a
mixture of such strategies. In fact, a general mixing principle implies that in any stochastic game,
any k-memory strategy (even if all memory states are private) is equivalent to a mixed strategy
that is a mixture of (uncountably many) public k-memory strategies.
is principle follows from the following construction of a mixture of public k-memory strategies.
Let σ be a k-memory strategy with memory statesmt , action function σα , and memory updating
function σm . For any sequence of permutations of [k] := {1, . . . ,k}, pi = (pit )∞t=1, we dene the
public k-memory piσ strategy that follows the strategy σ and that makes public the memory states
renamed according to pi .
Formally, the memory statesmt of piσ are functions of the the memory states of σ : mt = pit (mt ) ∈
[k]); its action function (piσ )α is given by (piσ )α (t , zt ,mt ) = σα ((t , zt ,mt ); and its memory updating
function (piσ )m is given by (piσ )m(t , zt ,mt , it , jt ) = σm(t , zt ,mt , it , jt ).
e mixture of piσ , where the sequence of random permutations pit , t = 1, 2 . . ., is a sequence of
i.i.d. permutations of [k] and each pit is uniformly distributed over all k! permutations, is equivalent
to the k-memory strategy σ .
5.2 Recall-based strategies
e denitions in this section apply to a general stochastic game. A few of the open problems in
this section concern some specic stochastic game.
A recall-based strategy is a memory-based strategy in which the memory statesmt is simply
zt−kt , it−kt , jt−kt , . . . , zt−1, it−1, jt−1, zt
, where kt < t .As it is a memory-based strategy it follows that kt+1 ≤ kt + 1. A k-recall strategy is
a recall-based strategy where the recall size kt equals k . A nite-recall strategy is a k-recall strategy
for some xed nite k .
In a recall-based strategy the memory states are public and the memory update function is
deterministic. erefore, it follows from [Hansen et al., 2016, eorem 6] that in the Big Match,
Player 1 has no worthy strategy that is a nite-recall strategy.
A natural question that arises is what is the minimal recall (as a function of t ) that is needed for
an ε-optimal strategy in a stochastic game. In order to state this problem formally, we introduce
the concept of f -recall strategies, where f : N→ N is a nondecreasing function with f (t) < t and
f (t + 1) ≤ f (t) + 1.
An f -recall strategy is a memory-based strategy in which the memory statemt is
zt−f (t ), it−f (t ), jt−f (t ), . . . , zt−1, it−1, jt−1, zt .
e question that arises is what are the functions f for which there is an f -recall strategy that is
ε-optimal. e question applies to a general stochastic game as well as to the special case of the
Big Match.
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It is worthwhile to note that the ε-optimal strategy in the Big Match that is introduced in the
present paper is an f -recall strategy with f (t) ≤ K log tε for some positive constant K .
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